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Abstract  Understanding others’ intentions and representing them as being able to 
understand intentions are relevant factors in cooperation, as is the ability to represent 
shared goals and coordinated action plans (joint intentions). To endow artificial systems 
with cooperative functionality, they need to be enabled to adopt the goals of another 
individual and act together with the other to achieve these goals. Such systems may be 
embodied as robotic agents or as humanoid agents projected in virtual reality 
(“embodied cooperative systems”). A central question is how the processes involved 
interact and how their interplay can be modeled. For example, inter-agent cooperation 
relies very much on common ground, i.e. the mutually shared knowledge of the 
interlocutors. Nonverbal behaviors such as gaze and gestures are important means of 
coordinating attention between interlocutors (joint attention) in the pursuit of goals. In 
the context of cooperative settings, the view that humans are users of a certain “tool” 
has shifted to that of a “partnership” with artificial agents, insofar they can be 
considered as being able to take initiative as autonomous entities. This chapter will 
outline these ideas taking the virtual humanoid agent “Max” as an example.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The idea of embodied cooperative systems pursues a vision of systems that are helpful 
to humans by making interaction between humans and artificial systems natural and 
efficient. The long-term objective of our research is a thorough understanding of the 
processes and functional constituents of cognitive interaction in order to replicate them 
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in artificial systems that can communicate and cooperate with humans in a natural way. 
While “cooperative system” could be said to mean a pair (or group) of individuals 
acting together in the attempt to accomplish a common goal, we prefer the notion of a 
system exhibiting cooperative behavior by taking on (some of) the goals of another 
individual and acting together with the other to achieve these shared goals. Cooperation 
thus involves, as we shall explain further below, some kind of joint intention, which 
means the ability to represent coordinated action plans for shared goals. Crucial for such 
cooperation is communication, and when we speak of embodied systems here, the idea 
is that these systems “by nature” can also employ nonverbal behaviors in cooperative 
dialogue when coordinating actions between agents.  
This contribution is written from the perspective of artificial intelligence which, 
as an academic discipline, is concerned with building machines – artificial agents – that 
model human intelligent behaviors and exploit them in technical applications. Such 
behaviors typically include the functions of perceiving, reasoning, and acting. Research 
has been moving on towards envisioning artificial agents (e.g. autonomous robots) as 
partners rather than tools with whom working ‘shoulder-by-shoulder’ with humans can 
be effective (Breazeal et al. 2004). Then such systems will also need to incorporate 
capacities which enable them to align with their human interactant through shared 
beliefs and intentions. When we thus view agents as intentional systems, a central idea 
is that their behavior can be understood by attributing them beliefs, desires and 
intentions (see Sect. 2). The questions particularly addressed from this perspective in 
this chapter are the following:  
1. How can joint intentions and cooperation be modeled and simulated? 
2. Can we attribute joint intention to a system or team involving both, a human and an 
artificial agent? 
 
One of the most basic mental skills is inferring intentions – the ability to see 
others as intentional agents and to understand what someone else is doing. Intentions 
are not directly observable, thus they need to be inferred from the interactant’s overt 
behaviors. The types of information exploited to infer intentions are comprised by the 
interactant’s verbal behavior, gaze and facial expression, gestures, as well as the 
perceived situation and prior knowledge. Hence inferring intentions is not a monolithic 
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mental faculty, but a composite of different mechanisms including attentive processes 
(i.e. processes enabling a system to actively focus on a target) and more general 
cognitive processes such as memory storage or reasoning. Both, understanding others’ 
intentions and representing them as being able to understand intentions, are relevant 
factors in cooperation.  
Human beings (and certain animals) can develop a mental representation of the 
other, making assumptions (possibly false ones) about the other’s beliefs, desires, 
intentions and probable actions – a ‘Theory of Mind’ (Premack and Woodruff 1978). 
Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to understand others as rational agents, 
whose behavior is lead by intentional states like beliefs and desires. There are two 
aspects of Theory of Mind: ‘cognitive’ ToM (inferring intentional states of the other), 
and ‘affective’ ToM (inferring emotional states of the other), referring to an 
understanding of what the other is likely to do resp. what are the other’s feelings. These 
ideas may also be a valuable prerequisite in modeling communication with virtual 
humans (Krämer 2008). While our own work has included artificial agents that can infer 
another agent’s emotional state (e.g. Boukricha et al. 2011), we shall in the following 
mainly focus on the intentional states involved in cooperation.  
To endow artificial systems with cooperative functionality, they need to be 
enabled to adopt (some of) the goals of another individual and act together with the 
other to achieve these shared goals.1 Acting together requires that intentional agents 
engage with one another to form a joint intention, i.e. represent coordinated action plans 
for achieving their common goals in joint cooperative activity (Tomasello et al. 2005; 
Bratman 1992). The activity itself may be more simple (e.g. engaging in a conversation; 
see Sect. 2) or complex (like constructing a model airplane; see Sect. 3). For 
collaborative engagement, Tomasello et al. (2005) further stress the importance of joint 
attention (mutual knowledge of interactants sharing their focus of attention; see Sect. 4) 
as well as interactants’ ability to reverse action roles and help the other if needed.  
If we want to construct artificial systems that are helpful to humans – interacting 
with us like “partners” –, then such systems should be able to understand and respond to 
the human’s wants in order to be assistive in a given situation. Technically, this 
                                                
1 The aspect of “mutual benefit” often included in definitions of cooperation is not taken up here because 
artificial systems do not seem to have genuine interests that could benefit from cooperation; see (Stephan 
et al. 2008). 
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challenge involves the implementation of a range of skills such as: processing language, 
gaze and gestures, representing intentional states for self and other, detecting and 
manipulating the other’s attention, responding to bids for joint attention, accomplishing 
goals in joint activity.  
In the remainder of this chapter, we will outline these ideas taking the virtual 
humanoid agent “Max” as a model for a communicative and cooperative agent. We will 
first look at Max as a “conversational machine” and describe its cognitive architecture, 
then move on to cooperation by examining details of a cooperative construction 
scenario, focus on the coordination of attention, and conclude with a view of how the 
perception of artificial systems may change from tool to partnership.  
 
 
2 Conversational Machines 
 
The development of conversational machines, i.e. machines that can conduct human-
like dialogue, has been a goal of artificial intelligence research for long (Schank 1971; 
Cassell et al. 2000). Why would we want to build such machines in general? On the one 
hand, there is the motive that learning to generate certain intelligent behaviors in 
artificial systems will help us to understand these behaviors in detail. That is, in our 
research we devise explanatory models in the form of computer simulations to obtain a 
better understanding of cognitive and social factors of communication. On the other 
hand, building conversational machines is expected to help make communication 
between humans and machines more intuitive.  
 
 
2.1 Machines as Intentional Systems  
 
Building a machine that can exhibit or simulate rational behavior (as if it were an agent 
acting rationally to further its goals in the light of its beliefs) leads us to look at 
machines as intentional systems, i.e. systems that perceive changes in the world, 
represent mental attitudes (like beliefs, goals, etc.), and reason about mental attitudes in 
order to arrive at decisions on how to plan actions and act.  
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 Research approaches towards modeling mental attitudes and practical reasoning 
are frequently based on functional models of planning and choosing actions by means-
ends analysis, mainly in versions of the belief-desire-intention paradigm (BDI) (Rao 
and Georgeff 1991).2 The basic idea is the description of the internal working state of an 
agent by means of intentional states (beliefs, desires, intentions) as well as the layout of 
a control architecture that allows the agent to choose rationally a sequence of actions on 
the basis of their representations. By recursively elaborating a hierarchical plan 
structure, specific intentions are generated until, eventually, executable actions are 
obtained (Wooldridge 2002).  
 Modeling intentional states is based on their symbolic representation. One of its 
assets is the flexibility it provides for planning and reasoning. In beliefs, for instance, 
facts concerning the world may be stored that an agent is not (or no longer) able to 
perceive at the moment, which, however, have effect on the agent’s further planning. It 
is a difference, though, whether an agent draws conclusions simply on the basis of his 
beliefs and desires or whether he makes use of them – with a corresponding cognitive 
representation – recognizing them as his own. In many cases such differentiation may 
not have functional advantages. An agent should be expected, however, to represent 
intentional states explicitly as being his own ones, if he must also record and deal 
specifically with other agents’ intentional states.  
 
 
2.2 Bielefeld Max Project 
 
In our research laboratory at Bielefeld taking a cognitive modeling approach scientific 
enquiry and engineering are closely intertwined. Creating an artificial system that 
replicates aspects of a natural system can help us understand the internal mechanisms 
that lead to particular effects. Special for our approach is that we are not just building 
and studying intelligent functions in separate. Over many years, we have attempted to 
build coherent comprehensive systems integrating both symbolic and dynamic system 
paradigms, one of them “Max”.  
 
                                                
2 The BDI approach comes from Michael Bratman (Bratman 1987); one of its fundamentals can be traced 
back to the work of Daniel Dennett (Dennett 1987) on the behavior of intentional systems. 
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Fig. 1 Virtual human Max: outer appearance and schematic view of internal state 
 
 
Max is a “virtual human” – an artificial agent embodied in virtual reality with a 
person-like appearance (see Fig. 1, left). By means of microphones and video cameras 
or tracker systems, Max can “hear” and “see” his human interlocutors and process 
verbal instructions and gestures. Max is equipped with verbal conversational abilities 
and can employ his virtual body to exhibit nonverbal behaviors in face-to-face 
interaction. With a modulated synthetic voice and an animated face and body, Max is 
able to speak and gesture, and to mimic emotions (Kopp and Wachsmuth 2004). The 
face of Max is computer-animated by simulated muscle effects and displays lip-
synchronous speech, augmented by eyebrow raises and emotional facial expression. 
Max’s articulated body is driven by a kinematic skeleton (comprising roughly one-third 
of the degrees of freedom of the human skeleton), with synchronized motion generators 
giving a realistic impression for his body movements. Emotional expression (which also 
includes voice modulation) is driven by a dynamic system, which responds to various 
kinds of stimuli (external: seeing faces, bad words, etc.; internal: goal achievement or 
failure, resulting in positive resp. negative emotions), and which defines the agent’s 
explicit emotional state over time in pleasure-arousal-dominance (PAD) space (Becker 
et al. 2004). The agent is controlled by a cognitive architecture (Sect. 2.3) which is 
based on the symbolic belief-desire-intention (BDI) approach to modeling rational 
agents, while integrating concurrent reactive behaviors and emotions. Thus the mental 
state of Max is comprised by an intentional as well as an emotional state (see Fig. 1, 
right).  
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With the Bielefeld Max project we investigate the details of face-to-face 
interaction and how it is possible to describe them – in parts – so precisely that a 
machine can be made to simulate them. This means that collecting insights about the 
functioning of human cognitive interaction is an important focus of our work. A 
technical goal is also the construction of a system as functional and convincing as 
possible that may be applied in different ways.  
 
 
2.3 Cognitive Architecture 
 
To organize the complex interplay of sensory, cognitive and actoric abilities, a cognitive 
architecture has been developed for Max (Leßmann et al. 2006), aiming at making his 
behavior appear believable, intelligent, and emotional. Here, ‘cognitive’ refers to the 
structures and processes underlying mental activities, including attentive processes. 
Bearing a functional resemblance to the links that exist between perception, action, and 
cognition in humans, the architecture has been designed for performing multiple 
activities simultaneously, asynchronously, in multiple modalities, and on different time 
scales. It provides for reactive and deliberative behaviors running concurrently, with a 
mediator resolving conflicts in favor of the behavior with the highest utility value.  
Figure 2 gives an outline of the cognitive architecture of Max. Explicitly 
represented goals (desires), which may be introduced through internal processing as 
well as by external influences, are serving as “inner motivation” triggering behavior. 
Max can have several desires at the same time, the highest-rated of which is selected by 
a utility function to become the current intention. The BDI interpreter determines the 
current intention on the basis of existing beliefs, current desires as well as options for 
actions.  
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Fig. 2 Outline of the cognitive architecture of Max (Reproduced from Leßmann et al. 
2006) 
 
Options for actions are available in a plan library in the form of abstract plans 
that are described by preconditions, context conditions, consequences that may be 
accomplished, and a priority function. Plan selection is further influenced by the current 
emotional state (in PAD space, see above) in that the emotion is used as precondition 
and context condition of plans to choose among alternative actions. If a concrete plan 
drawn up on the basis of these facts has been executed successfully, the related goal will 
become defunct.  
 The conduct of dialogue is based on an explicit modeling of communicative 
functions related to, but more specific than, multimodal communicative acts (Poggi and 
Pelachaud 2000) and generalizing speech act theory (Searle and Vanderveken 1985). A 
communicative function explicates the functional aspects of a communicative act on 
three levels (interaction, discourse, content) and includes a performative reflecting the 
interlocutor’s intention, with a dialogue manager controlling reactive behaviors and 
creating appropriate utterances in response (Kopp et al. 2005). Dialogue is performed in 
accordance with the mixed initiative-principle, this means, for instance, that in case the 
human fails to answer, Max himself takes the initiative and acts as the speaker. The plan 
structure of the BDI system makes it possible to assert new goals during the 
performance of an intention that may replace the current intention, provided it has a 
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higher priority. If the previous intention is not specifically abandoned in this process 
and its context conditions are still valid, it will become active again after the 
interruption.  
  
 
2.4 Max as a Museum Guide 
 
Since 2004 Max has been employed as a museum guide in a public computer museum 
(the Heinz Nixdorf MuseumsForum in Paderborn), taking the step from a research 
prototype to a system being confronted with many visitors in a rich real-world setting 
(Kopp et al. 2005). Displayed on a large projection screen (Fig. 3), Max provides the 
visitors with various information and engages them in a conversation. For instance, 
greeting a group of visitors, he could say: “Max, that’s me. I’m an artificial person that 
can speak and gesture. I am artificial, but I can express myself just like you...” A visitor 
might ask Max “How is the weather?” and Max would then access the current weather 
forecast in the internet and read it to the visitor. Altogether, this research has embarked 
on the goal of building embodied agents that can engage with humans in face-to-face 
conversation and demonstrate many of the same communicative behaviors as exhibited 
by humans.  
 
 
Fig. 3 Max interacting with visitors in the Heinz-Nixdorf-MuseumsForum 
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A screening was done after the first 7 weeks of Max’s employment in the 
computer museum (Kopp et al. 2005). Statistics was based on log files anonymously 
recorded from dialogues between Max and visitors to the museum. Among other 
aspects, the data were evaluated with respect to the successful recognition of a 
communicative function, that is, whether Max could associate a visitor’s want with an 
input. We found that Max recognized a communicative function in nearly two-thirds of 
all cases. Even when Max had sometimes recognized an incorrect communicative 
function (as humans may also do), we may conclude that in these cases Max conducted 
sensible dialogue with the visitors. In the other one-third of cases, Max did not turn 
speechless but simulated “small talk” by employing commonplace phrases, still tying in 
visitors with diverse kinds of social interaction.  
In some sense, Max could be attributed rational behavior (as if he were an agent 
acting rationally), namely, “minimal rationality” (Dretske 2006): This notion requires 
not only that behavior be under the causal control of a representational state, but that it 
be explained by the content of that representational state. Minimal rationality, so to say, 
requires that what is done is done for a reason (not necessarily a good reason). In light 
of the above statistics on Max’s service as a museum guide, Max’s answers were given 
for a reason (in the fulfillment of communicative goals Max associated with visitors’ 
inputs) in many cases. That is, his behavior might be termed “minimally rational” in 
Dretske’s sense (at least in an as-if sense – by the way the agent was programmed).  
 
 
3 From Conversation to Cooperation 
 
The above explained ideas about Max as a conversational machine are relevant also for 
embodied cooperative systems, i.e. systems acting together with others to accomplish 
shared goals by employing verbal and nonverbal behaviors in coordinating their actions. 
Such systems may be embodied as robotic agents (e.g. Breazeal et al. 2004) or (such as 
Max) as humanoid agents projected in virtual reality. If we want to achieve that Max 
and a human interlocutor mutually engage and coordinate action in solving a joint 
problem, a central question is how the processes involved interact and how their 
interplay can be modeled. For example, inter-agent cooperation relies very much on 
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common ground, i.e. the mutually shared knowledge of the interlocutors. Nonverbal 
behaviors such as gaze and gestures are important means of coordinating attention 
between interlocutors and therefore related to both inferring intentions and coordinating 
actions. Note that the conduct of dialogue is a form of cooperation, because participants 
have to coordinate their mental states.  
In one of our research settings Max was employed to study cooperative dialogue 
in a construction task, where Max and a human interlocutor solve the joint problem of 
constructing a model airplane from a ‘Baufix’ wooden toykit (Leßmann et al. 2006). In 
this setting the human interlocutor and Max stand opposite each other at a table (see 
Fig. 4, left). With the exception of the person shown left, the pictured scene is projected 
virtual reality. On the table, there are different building bricks: bars with three holes or 
five holes, several screws with colored caps, a cube with holes on all sides, etc., all 
items will be assembled in the course of the dialogue. The human sees Max and the 
entire setting three-dimensionally by means of stereo glasses and hears the synthetic 
voice of Max due to surround sound from hidden speakers.  
 
    
Fig. 4 Cooperative dialogue with Max (left); virtual world perception of Max (right) 
 
To enable the artificial agent to participate in the interaction, Max is equipped 
with both view sensors for the perception of the virtual environment (see Fig. 4, right) 
and diverse sensors to capture the signals of the human in the real world. Max ‘sees’ the 
human’s gaze direction as well as hand and arm movements by means of an infrared 
tracking system and data gloves, and – via a radio microphone – he ‘hears’ the human’s 
speaking which he processes with a speech recognizer. The percepts of both worlds 
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(real and virtual) are integrated to form a coherent perception of the ongoing interaction. 
Both the human and Max are able to have individual parts assembled by natural 
language instructions and gestures, carried out in simulation with realistic sounds 
added. While the human interlocutor in general has the role of proposing the next 
construction step, Max has knowledge of construction details and helps the other with 
his role if needed. Thus action roles may switch between the interactants according to 
their competences. This is done, for example, as follows:3  
 
Max  Hello, I’m Max. How can I help you? [smiling]. 
Human  Explain the assembly of a propeller. 
Max  Let’s do it together. First, a screw has to be inserted into the middle of a 
three-hole-bar. 
Human  Insert the yellow screw into the bar [points to a three-hole-bar, the first screw 
is inserted into the first hole]. 
Max  No, that was the wrong hole [screw slips out]. 
Max  I’ll explain it to you again. A screw has to be inserted into the middle of a 
three-hole-bar. 
Human  Insert the screw into the middle of the three-hole-bar [screw is inserted into 
the middle of the three-hole-bar chosen before]. 
Max  Okay, that’s correct. Now insert this [points to the bar with the screw] into 
the three-hole-bar. 
Human  You do it. 
Max  Okay, I will perform the action [the objects are connected as instructed]. 
Max  And now the bars need to be turned crosswise to each other [shows the 
rotation using a gesture], etc. 
 
Fitted to this trial scenario, Max is equipped with limited knowledge of the 
‘Baufix world’ and is capable of planning and reasoning such that he may act as an 
intelligent assistant. Specialized planners (for constructing Baufix objects) and 
memories (for storing dynamically updated representations for the state of constructed 
objects) have been integrated into the cognitive architecture. Further, Max has some 
                                                
3 Dialogue translated from German to English. 
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grammatical rules and a semantic lexicon for processing the meaning of dialogue 
inputs. Within a limited vocabulary Max is able to talk – including the generation of 
appropriate gestures –, producing verbal utterances from a repertoire of stereotype 
statements. These also include the term ‘I’, without Max having a notion of himself at 
the current time.4 Independent of that it could be demonstrated how Max can cope with 
changing situations that require language, perception, and action to be coordinated so 
that cooperation between the human and the artificial system takes place with natural 
efficiency.  
 
 
4 Coordinating Attention 
 
As was said in the introduction, one of our questions is how joint intentions and 
cooperation can be modeled and simulated. Attentive processes and sharing attention 
are important precursors for cooperative interaction in which interactants pursue shared 
goals by coordinated action plans (joint intentions). Inter-agent cooperation relies much 
on common ground, one aspect being whether interactants know together that they 
share a focus of attention (e.g. know that they are both looking at the same target object 
as illustrated in Figs. 5 and 6 below). This kind of intentionally sharing a focus of 
attention is referred to as “joint attention” below. It would presuppose interactants to 
mutually perceive one another and perceive the perceptions of the other, that is, attend 
to each other. An important means of coordinating attention between interlocutors are 
nonverbal behaviors such as gaze and gestures. For example, following each other’s 
direction of gaze allows interlocutors to share their attention.  
Judged to be crucial for goal-directed behavior, attention has been characterized 
as an increased awareness of something (Brinck 2003), intentionally directed perception 
(Tomasello et al. 2005), or as “the temporally-extended process whereby an agent 
concentrates on some features of the environment to the (relative) exclusion of others” 
(Kaplan and Hafner 2006). A foundational skill in human social interaction, joint (or 
shared) attention can be defined as simultaneously allocating attention to a target as a 
                                                
4 On how to configure an artificial agent so as to enable him to adopt a first-person perspective see 
Wachsmuth (2008). 
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consequence of attending to each other’s attentional states, or “re-allocating attention to 
a target because it is the object of another person’s attention” (Deák et al. 2001). In 
contrast to joint perception (the state in which interactants are just perceiving the same 
target object without further constraints concerning their mental states), the intentional 
aspect of joint attention has been stressed, in that interlocutors have to deliberately 
focus on the same target while being mutually “aware” of sharing their focus of 
attention (Tomasello et al. 2005). If virtual humans are to engage in joint attention with 
a human interactant, they need to be enabled to meet conditions as described above. For 
instance, they would need to infer the human interactant’s focus of attention from the 
interactant’s overt behaviors. Prerequisites for this are attention detection (e.g. by gaze 
following) as well as attention manipulation (e.g. by issuing gaze or pointing gestures).  
We have investigated joint attention in a cooperative interaction scenario 
(different from the one described in Sect. 3) with the virtual human Max, where again 
the human interlocutor meets the agent face-to-face in virtual reality. The human’s body 
and gaze are picked up by infrared cameras and an eye-tracker (mounted on the stereo 
glasses for three-dimensional viewing), informing Max where the interlocutor is 
looking at; this way Max can follow the human’s gaze (see Fig. 5). For instance, when 
the human focuses on an object, Max can observe the human’s gaze alternating between 
an object and Max’s face and attempt to establish joint attention, by focusing on the 
same object. Or, initiating a bid for joint attention, Max can choose an object and 
attempt to draw the attention of his interlocutor to the object by gaze and pointing 
gestures until joint attention is established.  
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Fig. 5 Max can pick up the human’s gaze by means of eye-tracking 
 
So, which inferences exactly need to be drawn to establish joint attention by 
aligning the mental states of cooperating agents? Pfeiffer-Leßmann and Wachsmuth 
(2009) describe a formal model which specifies the conditions and cognitive processes 
that underlie the capacity for joint attention. In accordance with Tomasello et al. (2005) 
joint attention is conceived of as an intentional process. Our model provides a 
theoretical framework for cooperative interaction with a virtual human (in our case: 
Max). It is specified in an extended belief-desire-intention modal logic, which accounts 
for the temporally-extended process of attention (Kaplan and Hafner 2006) in 
interaction between two intentional agents, during which agents’ beliefs may change. 
To account for such dynamics of an agent’s beliefs in our model, the logic was extended 
to include activation values. The idea is that activation values influence the beliefs’ 
accessibility for mental operations, resulting in an overall saliency of a belief (and 
likewise other intentional states). For instance “increased awareness” (Brinck 2003) can 
be modeled by use of activation values.  
In order to account for these ideas, the above described cognitive architecture 
(Sect. 2.3) adopting the BDI paradigm of rational agents (Rao and Georgeff 1991) has 
been augmented by incorporating a partner model to account for the agent’s perspective 
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on its interlocutor, as well as a dynamic working memory. The working memory stores 
the changing beliefs (and other intentional states) of the agent, and also the target 
objects that may be in the agent’s focus of attention. Activation values are used as a 
measure for saliency, i.e. an object with a higher activation value is more salient than 
one with a lower activation value. Whenever an object gets in the agent’s gaze focus 
(see Fig. 4, right) or is subject to internal processing, activation values are increased.  
To establish joint attention, an agent must employ coordination mechanisms of 
understanding and directing the intentions underlying the interlocutor’s attentional 
behavior, such as: tracking the attentional behavior of the other by gaze monitoring; 
deriving candidate objects the interlocutor may be focusing on; inferring whether 
attentional direction cues of the interlocutor are uttered intentionally; reacting instantly, 
as simultaneity is crucial in joint attention; and in response employing an adequate overt 
behavior which can be observed by the interlocutor. Meeting these conditions, Pfeiffer-
Leßmann and Wachsmuth (2009) describe the mental state required for an agent i to 
believe in joint attention while focusing conjointly with its interlocutor j on a certain 
target ϑ (theta). While we won’t go into detail here, see Fig. 6 and brief explanations 
following for an illustration of these ideas.  
Figure 6 illustrates the following (BEL, GOAL, and INTEND are modal 
connectives in the logic used for modeling beliefs, goals, intentions and attentional 
states):  
 
 
Fig. 6 Joint attention focusing on a target object ϑ from artificial agent i’s perspective 
(Reproduced from Pfeiffer-Leßmann and Wachsmuth 2009) 
intention
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If agent i (here artificial agent Max) attends (focuses attention: ATT) to a target ϑ and 
has the goal that both, agents i (Max) and j (human interactant) jointly attend to the 
same target ϑ, then agent i needs to infer (and assert in the partner model)  
 
– that agent j (also) attends to the target ϑ 
– that agent j intends (INTEND) to attend (intentionally attends) to the target ϑ 
– that agent j adopts the goal that both agents jointly attend to the target ϑ, and  
– that agent j (human interactant) believes (BEL) that (artificial agent) i attends to 
(human interactant) j 
 
T (test-if) pertains to test-actions that are to infer if human interactant j focuses attention 
on agent i while simultaneously (observed by gaze-alternation) allocating attention to 
target ϑ. If agent i (Max) perceives the interlocutor’s behavior as a test-action and is 
able to resolve a candidate target object, the agent infers that the interlocutor’s focus of 
attention resides on that target.5 The formalization provides a precise means as to which 
conditions need to be met and which inferences need to be drawn to establish joint 
attention by aligning the mental states of cooperating agents.  
 Going from this formal model to the implemented system, some heuristics had 
to be used, for instance when the human interlocutor focuses several times (or for an 
extended duration) on an object, the agent interprets this as the attention focus being 
intentionally drawn upon the target, or that the addressee’s response to an agent 
initiating joint attention needs to take place within a certain time frame. To follow this 
up, an eye-tracker study was conducted (Pfeiffer-Leßmann et al. 2012) examining dwell 
times (fixation durations) of referential gaze during the initiation of joint attention, the 
results of which further contribute to making our formal model of joint attention 
operational.  
 
 
 
                                                
5 For further detail, the formal definition of joint attention, and the specification of epistemic actions that 
lead to the respective beliefs and goals see Pfeiffer-Leßmann and Wachsmuth (2009). 
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5 Conclusion: From Tool to Partnership 
 
From the perspective of artificial intelligence, this contribution has addressed embodied 
cooperative systems, i.e. embodied systems exhibiting cooperative behavior by taking 
on (some of) the goals of another individual and acting together with the other to 
accomplish these goals employing verbal and nonverbal communicative behaviors. The 
questions we set out to address from this perspective were the following: (1) How can 
joint intentions and cooperation be modeled and simulated? (2) Can we attribute joint 
intention to a system or team involving both, a human and an artificial agent?  
 Cooperation, as was said in Sect. 1, involves adopting (some of) the goals of 
another individual and acting together with the other to achieve these shared goals. Joint 
intention refers to the ability of interactants to represent coordinated action plans for 
achieving their common goal in joint activity.  
Taking the virtual humanoid agent “Max” as an example of an embodied 
cooperative system, we introduced first steps towards how joint intentions and 
cooperation can be modeled and simulated. We described a cognitive architecture, 
based on the BDI paradigm of rational agents and augmented by a partner model 
accounting for the agent’s perspective on its interlocutor (representing the inferred 
intentional states in the sense of ‘cognitive’ ToM), as well as a dynamic working 
memory storing the changing intentional and attentive states of the agent. This cognitive 
architecture enables Max to engage in joint activities (conducting conversation, solving 
a joint problem) with human interlocutors. Further we have outlined which inferences 
need to be drawn to establish joint attention (the common ground of interactants 
knowing together that they share a focus of attention) by aligning the mental states of 
cooperating agents. While a complete model of joint intention remains to be done, we 
used the case of joint attention to lay out how an artificial agent can represent goals and 
intentions of his human interactant in a partner model that could be employed for 
representing coordinated action plans in the plan structure of the BDI system. Thus we 
could provide some preliminary insights on question (1) as to how joint intentions and 
cooperation can be modeled and simulated.  
Our second question (can we attribute joint intention to a system or team 
involving both, a human and an artificial agent?) is more complicated since it involves 
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the idea of partnership, i.e. a relationship between two (or more) individuals working or 
acting together. There is accumulating evidence that in the context of cooperative 
settings, the view that humans are users of a certain “tool” has shifted to that of a 
“partnership” with artificial agents, insofar they can in some sense be considered as 
being able to take initiative as autonomous entities (Breazeal et al. 2004; Negrotti 
2005). According to Negrotti (2005), a true partner relationship is to be conceived as a 
peer-based interaction, wherein each partner can start some action unpredicted by the 
other. Looking at Max, we note that the cooperative interaction in the above described 
scenarios is characterized by a high degree of interactivity, with frequent switches of 
initiative and roles of the interactants. In consequence, though being goal-directed, the 
interaction with Max appears fairly unpredictable. Thus Max appears to be more than a 
tool (thing) entirely at our disposal and under our control.  
So, in light of what has been said above, can we attribute joint intention to a 
system or team involving both, a human and an artificial agent?  
Perhaps one day. There is a long way to go, though. We have to acknowledge 
that state-of-art agent technology is still far from being sufficiently sophisticated to 
implement all the behaviors necessary for a cooperative functionality and in particular 
joint intention in a coherent technical system.6 But it has to be realized that artificial 
systems may increasingly take on functions which were reserved to human beings so far 
and thus seem to become more human-like. For instance, in recent work (Mattar and 
Wachsmuth 2014), a person memory was developed for Max which allows the agent to 
use personal information remembered about his interlocutors from previous encounters 
which, as evaluations have shown, makes him a better conversational partner in the eyes 
of his human interlocutors.  
Also to be noted, the desires of Max do not originate in “real needs” that Max 
might have; they were programmed functionally equivalent to intentional states we 
would attribute to a real person, resulting in behaviors that appear somewhat rational. 
Another programmed “need” of Max is that he demands his conversational partners to 
be polite. The emotional state of Max (see Sect. 2) is negatively influenced by inputs 
containing ungracious or politically incorrect wordings (“no-words”) which, when 
                                                
6 Note that, even when we have attempted to build a coherent comprehensive system, not all aspects 
described in this article have been integrated in one system, that is, different versions of “Max” were used 
to explore the above ideas in implemented systems. 
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repeated, can eventually trigger a plan causing the agent to leave the display and stay 
away until the emotion has returned to a balanced state (an effect introduced to de-
escalate rude visitor behavior in the museum). The period of absence can either be 
shortened by complimenting Max or extended by insulting him again, see (Becker et al. 
2004). Altogether, this kind of behavior of Max may be taken as beginnings of moral 
judgement.  
In conclusion: If we want to construct artificial systems that are helpful to 
humans and interact with us like “partners”, then such systems should be able to 
understand and respond to the human’s wants – infer and share our intentions – in order 
to be assistive in a given situation. It may be asked if it makes a big difference for 
embodied cooperative systems to be helpful whether their understandings and intentions 
(and the intentions they share with us) are real or “as-if ” (Stephan et al. 2008).  
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